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ABSTRACT
As the real estate industry enters into the 1990's, it is
experiencing a recession which has already resulted in a large
number of loan defaults, especially in the New England region
of the country. Unfortunately, many banks and developers have
fallen into insolvency because of problem real estate loans.
However, both banks and developers are struggling to control
the damage of these defaults, through various avenues of loan
workout.
In such an environment, it behooves a real estate owner to
understand the workout process. This begins by developing an
understanding of the regulatory pressures that control and
mold the workout policies and procedures of banks. Moreover,
the developer must understand the financial and non-financial
objectives and constraints of a bank negotiating a workout
loan. With this knowledge, the borrower can successfully
prepare for future workouts, thus developing beneficial
relationships with lenders, thereby facilitating agreement on
property and portfolio workout strategies. This thesis will
address these considerations and strategies.
Thesis Supervisor: Thomas Steele
Title: Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER ONE
Troubled Real Estate: Genesis of the Problems
The real estate and banking industries are suffering from
severe levels of real estate loan defaults, which ultimately
lead to workout negotiations. Both banks and their real
estate borrowers are struggling to survive through these
troubled times. This is especially true in New England. In
such an environment, real estate owners are forced to become
familiar with the considerations and negotiating strategies
necessary to ultimately survive. These considerations and
negotiating strategies will be the topic of this thesis.
As New England enters the 1990's, its' banking community is
struggling for its very survival. In the first half of 1990,
36 New England banks with combined assets of 29 billion have
failed, of which Bank of New England represents two-thirds.
Moreover, the senior vice president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, Thomas Cimeno has predicted that total assets
of banks expected to fail in the next twelve months should
equal roughly 30 billion. Particularly endangered in the
future are New Hampshire and Connecticut banks. "New
Hampshire is a basket case.... It's pretty well understood that
a lot of those companies are insolvent or on the road to
insolvencies", Cimeno stated. In Connecticut, ten point four
percent of all loans are non-performing. "If New England were
one big bank, it would be a problem bank and it would be
losing money", said Cimeno. 1
While the New England banking crisis is severe, it has to be
viewed in the context of the problems afflicting our national
banking system. Beginning in the early 1980's and continuing
until almost the middle of the decade, the real estate
industry was served with a potpourri of positive industrial
factors. The industry experienced large demand surges because
of the entry into the work force of the baby boomers and
women.2 Another key element in the growth of demand for
commercial space during this period was a national shift in
the economy. The United States changed from being a
manufacturing-based to a service-based economy, resulting in
a concurrent increase in demand for white-collar commercial
space.3 The real estate industry geared up to meet this
demand surge, and especially in New England due to its
financial services base.
However, certain changes orchestrated by Congress allowed the
real estate industry to over compensate for this increased
demand. In response to the complex problems of the banking
industry, which were largely due to the flight of depository
money from banks to money market accounts, Congress passed the
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.4
"This law had two main features. First, it
accelerated the deregulation of deposit pricing.
By offering a new money market deposit account,
commercial banks and thrifts could bid for the
deposits they had lost to money market funds.
Second, it attempted to revitalize the thrift
industry by expanding its charter-in particular by
granting additional freedoms to participate in
commercial real estate lending and development.
But this "new freedom" had a fatal flaw. Banks and
thrifts could compete for deposits on price, but
the government continued to insure those
deposits.. .The Banks lowered their standards and
accepted higher levels of credit risk. Bankers
searched for loans that generated big fees, high
yields, and were cost-effective to originate-a
search that led them to Third World governments,
real estate developers and leveraged buyout
sponsors."
The result was a huge influx of funds into real estate
investment, which because of the need to generate competitive
returns on deposits and a competitive lending market, was
willing to accept higher levels of risk for potentially higher
yielding credits.
These funds were augmented and implemented by a growing real
estate industry, which itself had been given additional
investment benefits by Congress. In 1981, Congress passed the
Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA). This Act dramatically
changed the Federal Tax Code and increased the attractiveness
of real estate investment by: lowering the effective maximum
capital gains tax rate; expanding the availability of tax
credits; and accelerating depreciation periods.6 Tax driven
syndicates thrived in this environment, resulting in a second
major funding source for real estate development, which too
often gained its sustenance from passive income tax shelter
and not project economic viability. These syndicates--in
order to place their money--bid up investment properties far
beyond their "cash flow value".7
These two factors led to enormous real estate over-supply,
created through economically unsound investment practices by
both developers and the banks. Because of the lagging
characteristics of real estate development and the duration of
real estate loans this was not immediately recognized, and
therefore these investment practices continued. Even when
Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which severely
curtailed the tax benefits that real estate investors and
syndicators had come to rely upon by: increasing the
depreciable life of real estate investments; eliminating
capital gain exclusions; and implementing passive loss ruless,
this development euphoria continued. Pension funds and
foreign investors entered the market and replaced syndicate
money.
The sum of these factors resulted in a competitive market
where unrealistic bidding rather than demand caused over
production and insupportable appreciation. In practically all
sectors of the industry there was a huge oversupply of
product. For example, "the vacancy rate for downtown office
space soared to 17% nationally, up from less than 4% a decade
ago and more than double the historic average of roughly 8%."9
Five Hundred million square feet of vacant office space sits
vacant in the United States today. 10
Rents and property values began to decline precipitously due
to this oversupply. This decline in value in turn caused a
slowdown in investment by foreign investors, pension funds and
banks. Many developers began to experience severe operating
cash flow deficiencies which had previously been met by the
abundant lending markets. However, concurrently commercial
banks were facing newly increased governmental scrutiny by
their regulatory agencies. Non-performing loans increased
dramatically, causing the banks to curtail lending severely
and turn their attention towards their problem real estate
loans. The ensuing credit crunch severely impacted the
purchase and sale of properties, further decreasing rents and
property values, which in turn increased the level of non-
performing loans, which increased the strength of the credit
crunch, thus resulting in a vicious circle. This phenomenon
is commonly called the "real estate death spiral." Needless
to say, this environment has severely affected the real estate
and banking industries. A rash of developer bankruptcies have
occurred and practically all developers and real estate
entrepreneurs find themselves wading through a sea of
problems. Similarly, banks have suffered greatly from their
commitment to real estate. Banking regulators estimate that
200 banks will fail this year alone1 , and possibly 440
through 1992. Moreover, William Seidman, Chairman of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, has said that "the bank
insurance fund will be insolvent by year end, due to the
projected failure of several large East Coast banks." 12
As outlined in the opening paragraph, New England banks are
having an even worse time of it than the rest of the country.
In the fourth quarter of 1990, non-performing real estate
assets in New England banks reached almost seven and one-half
billion dollars. This figure represents four and one-half
percent of total New England bank assets, and almost seventy
percent of their total non-performing assets. To extend this
observation, six and one-half percent of total New England
bank assets are non-performing. As a rule of thumb, bank
analysts believe that when a bank reaches a level of ten
percent of its assets classified as non-performing, the bank
will not be able to weather its' problem loans.13
Clearly the storm is not over. Real estate loans less than
ninety days past due amounted to almost seven hundred million
dollars. 14 This indicates continuing--if not increasing--
problems with real estate non-performing loans into the
future. The following graph depicts the marked increase in
non-performing real estate loans.
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This thesis will concentrate on the New England real estate
workout environment, but it is important to understand that
workout requirements are not limited to New England, and are,
in fact, a national problem: Nationally non-performing real
estate loans have increased from ten point six billion in 1985
11
to thirty-one point three billion in the third quarter of
1990.16 During the late 1980's, approximately 60% of all new
bank lending was in real estate, resulting in a
disproportionate exposure in bank loan portfolios. On
average, real estate jumped from 25% to 37% of portfolio
loans. 17  "The entire American banking system went on a
commercial real estate binge in the 1980's, that has brought
on a period of worsening troubles now in the early 90'S.",18
In this environment, where banks are struggling to meet
capital reserve requirements and diminish problem real estate
loans, developers require a map to guide them through the
restructuring of investment portfolios and their debt. To
survive, investors need to understand the legal and business
avenues available to economically downsize their investment
portfolio. Understanding these workout mechanisms is not
enough, however. Real estate developers must implement a
portfolio workout strategy based on a clear understanding of
the driving forces and allowable actions of their unwilling
partners--the banks. Within this framework, real estate
investors must adopt a flexible strategy which allows for
economically viable downsizing. Unfortunately, in some cases,
problems are of such a magnitude as to make this impossible.
This thesis will consider the driving forces and allowable
actions of banks within the workout environment (Chapters Two
and Three). It will then consider the potential avenues that
a workout situation may follow (Chapter Four). Finally,
within this framework, the author will recommend
considerations and strategies necessary to a successful
downsizing of a problematic portfolio of real estate
investments (Chapter Five).
1. "Failed Banks' Assets Forecast In New England", Lawrence
Ingrassia, New York Times, June 7, 1991.
2. "A Look at the Real Estate Cycle", Lawrence S. Bacow,
Esq., Professor of Urban Studies and Planning, Director of
Center for Real Estate Development, MIT CRED Newsletter,
Spring 1991.
3. "A Look at the Real Estate Cycle", Lawrence S. Bacow,
Esq., Professor of Urban Studies and Planning, Director of
Center for Real Estate Development, MIT CRED Newsletter,
Spring 1991.
4. "A Blueprint For Financial Reconstruction", Lowell L.
Bryan, Harvard Business Review, May-June 1991.
5. "A Blueprint For Financial Reconstruction", Lowell L.
Bryan, Harvard Business Review, May-June 1991.
6. "Principal Reasons for Default and Impact of Financial
Structure of Distressed Real Estate", Edward N. McPherson,
MIT Thesis, Cambridge, MA.
7. "How Did We Get Into This Mess?!", Dr. Peter Linneman,
Director of the Wharton Real Estate Center, University of
Pennsylvania.
8. "Principal Reasons for Default and Impact of Financial
Structure of Distressed Real Estate", Edward N. McPherson,
MIT thesis, Cambridge MA.
9. "Banking Real Estate Miseries", Steve Lohr, New York
Times, January 13, 1991.
10. "Banking's Real Estate Miseries", Steve Lohr, New York
Times, January 13, 1991.
11. "Banking's Real Estate Miseries", Steve Lohr, New York
Times, January 13, 1991.
12. "FDIC Expects To Be Insolvent By Year End", Paulette
Thomas, The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 1991.
13. This non-performing loan and asset information was
calculated from numbers provided by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston.
14. This information was provided by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston.
15. This graph was derived from numbers provided by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
16. "The Capital Crunch and Financial Restructurings",
Klatt, Frank and Mack, Real Estate Finance, Vol. 8 No. 1,
Spring 1991.
17. "Banking Real Estate Miseries", Steve Lohr, New York
Times, January 13, 1991.
18. "Banking Real Estate Miseries", Steve Lohr, New York
Times, January 13, 1991.
CHAPTER TWO
The Regulatory Influences of Bank Workout Behavior
In a workout environment such as New England's, a real estate
owner approaching a workout scenario with a bank must fully
understand the forces which frame and mold the way the bank
approaches negotiations. The choice of resolution (see
chapter four) which a bank may follow is determined by the
bank's policies and procedures, as well as the bank's
perception of the workout. It's a given that a bank's
negotiating strategy will not be a open book for the borrower.
Therefore, insight into the bank's alternatives is an art
which must be mastered for a successful workout. This without
question is the value of a good workout specialist, because it
is an art not easily mastered.1
In a troubled banking environment banking regulators directly
and indirectly control a bank's policies and procedures.
Since the regulatory bodies have the power to determine a
bank's policies and procedures, levy fines, change management
and even take over a bank, banks develop their business
practices with an eye towards escaping the wrath of the
regulators. Regulatory actions are always done in order to
rein in risk for the bank, and reestablish a strong viable
institution. However, it often results in the constraining of
a bank's creativity in a workout. This may be a good or bad
result, depending on your perspective. In good times
regulatory bodies may broadly review a bank in order to insure
that there are no gross wrongdoings or unsound business
practices. However, in times like these, regulators
aggressively scrutinize a bank from the top down and bottom
up, paying special attention to areas of risk for the bank.
The regulatory bodies greatly influence a bank's dealings with
troubled loans, and therefore it behooves a real estate owner
to understand the regulatory system, in order to gain insight
into a bank's tendencies in a workout negotiation.2
There are three main regulatory agencies. The Office of the
Comptroller of Currency's (OCC) principal role is regulating
national banks. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's
(FDIC) primary purpose is the insuring of depository
institutions and liquidating insolvent banks, but it also
regulates select state chartered banks. The Federal Reserve
has three primary roles: central banker, primary regulator of
all bank holding companies and regulator of state chartered
banks which are members of the federal reserve system.
Because these three agencies often overlap when carrying out
their regulatory functions, they try to accommodate and
coordinate with each other.
Such is the case of the shared national credit review program.
This program targets loan reviews for credits in excess of
twenty million dollars, in which two or more banks
participate. Teams of bank examiners, with representatives
from each agency, are brought together to review these loans
and subsequently assign a rating for the loan through a voting
mechanism. Each bank which participates in this loan must
accept the determined rating and carry the loan on the books
to reflect it. This program is of significance since these
types of loans usually represent a large proportion of a
national bank's loan portfolio. Bank of America, Security
Pacific and Wells Fargo were all greatly affected by this
program, when loans which they participated in were downgraded
through this system, forcing each bank to post large increases
in their loan loss reserves.3
This type of loan classification scrutiny is usually not
mimicked by the agencies on a singular basis. The regulatory
agencies tend to examine banks on a broader basis, and then
when necessary scrutinize classes of loans more carefully. In
New England, this means that real estate loan portfolios are
targeted for closer scrutiny.
When a bank examination team enters the bank, it tries to
examine the bank from the top down and bottom up. Bank
policies and procedures will be reviewed from both
perspectives to see if appropriate standards are being set and
how well they are communicated to line officers. For real
estate lending this analysis includes the effectiveness of the
loan review department and how closely the credits are being
monitored and accurately rated, the bank's accounting
treatment and reserve allocations, and the workout
department's policies and procedures. The examiners will also
analyze the quality of a banks management information systems
to see if the directors are able to financially monitor the
bank's investments.
Loan Review and Rating:
The review's main purpose is to gauge a bank's loan risk
exposure. As a initial step to determining risk exposure,
bank regulators will pick a lending area to do a statistical
sampling. If there is no particular area of concern then the
examiners will do a global review. From the initial sampling,
if there are a large numbers of loan down grades or problems
with the system, then the statistical review will be expanded.
For real estate, because of its lagging tendencies4 , early
identification of problems is critical. In New England banks
this currently entails the close scrutiny of a representative
sample of real estate loans. Examiners will open a loan file
to review the financial information presented. The examiner
through the file information will first determine if the
information is sufficient to review the property's underlying
fundamentals. The review will consider lease turnover,
expense ratios and so on, in an attempt to assess the loss
exposure of the credit. This requires up to date property
financials and appraisals. Moreover, the examiner will look
for information on the guarantor's financial condition. "Too
often a banker has not looked at the credit from a global
standpoint".5 The banker does not have a schedule of
contingent liabilities or personal financials of the
guarantors. In light of this information or a lack thereof
and the examiners financial analysis of the underlying
fundamentals of the property, the examiner will assign a loan
rating to the credit. The different loan ratings are as
follows:
Past Credits: These are fundamentally sound loans performing
as agreed upon with no evident weaknesses.
Special Mention Loans: These are loans which offer more than
the acceptable level of risk and are demonstrating weaknesses.
In example, a weakening industry or a credit balance sheet
which may be a problem down the road.
Substandard Loans: Loans which have problems which jeopardize
the future ability of the borrower to service the debt and
remain a performing loan. There is a probable loss, but the
loss exposure cannot be defined because of the situation of
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the loan.
Doubtful: There is a definite material loss, but that cannot
be determined because of some problem, such as the loan being
stuck in litigation.
Loss: This loan has been determined a full loss for the amount
indicated.6
While a regulatory agency may not explicitly force a bank to
adopt its rating of a loan, it does so implicitly. Regulators
are determining whether a bank's loan review is current and
realistic, as well as performing a critique of past lending
criteria. When a large proportion of a bank's loan ratings
are not similar to the examiner's, it indicates that the bank
is not sufficiently monitoring their loans. It will also
cause the regulators to expand their loan review with the high
potential of the regulatory agency taking some form of
corrective action.
Accounting Treatment and Loan Loss Allocations:
The regulators will also review a bank's accounting treatment
of troubled credits and loan loss allocation policy. When the
examiners determine inadequate loan review policies and
ratings, this area of consideration will be all the more
scrutinized. In addition, the regulators will scrutinize the
bank's accounting treatment of non-performing loans more
thoroughly.
First the examiners will ascertain whether the bank is
properly allocating non-performing and troubled loans on non-
accrual status. Performing loans are specified accrual loans
where interest payments are deemed income. Banks at times
stall the non-accrual specification and loan loss reserve
allocation in order to maintain higher income generation.
Non-accrual loans apply payments first to replenish the loan
loss reserve taken on the loan and then to principal, until
such time that the principal balance is deemed supportable by
the credit, thereby bringing the loan back into performing
status. Subsequent payment amounts can then be deemed income.
"If a company shows a large amount of loans more than ninety
days delinquent and still accruing interest, the examiner
should really ask some questions regarding the bank's reserve
practice. Conservative bankers do not have a lot of loans in
ninety day accrual, because they are very aggressive in their
chargeoffs. "7
The examiners will also be reviewing the bank's loan loss
reserve practices. Loan loss reserves should be allocated for
specific anticipated loss on loans as well as allocations
based on loan loss migration analysis of loan categories. 8
This reserve and the bank's capital reserves are the
offsetting buffer against imminent loan losses, which protects
a bank from insolvency. Therefore, regulatory agencies are
very concerned in a troubled loan environment with the
sufficiency of a bank's capital reserve.9
Workout Department Review:
Another area of review during troubled times will be analysis
of the effectiveness of the bank's workout departments. At
issue will be whether the workout department is receiving
proper guidance in their work from the principal officers and
directors of the bank. "Sometimes workout departments are on
too long a leash and are too creative in their workout
restructurings. "11
From the examination team's work a risk rating will be
assigned to the bank, which goes from 1 (very strong) to 5
("in death throes"). In addition, the regulatory agency may
assign a variety of corrective actions in the form of policy
and procedure agreements, which tend to correspond with
ratings, but not always. These agreements are the regulatory
agency's stick which mandates a bank's future operational
policies and procedures. Therefore, a bank which wishes to
maintain total control of their business needs to avoid any
negative reviews by their regulatory agency. In this severe
real estate recessionary environment, few banks in New England
have been able to fully avoid rating downgrades.
A bank with a one rating is considered very strong and will
most probably avoid any corrective agreement, unless there is
some unusual condition, such as illegal business practices.
A two rated bank is generally satisfactory, but may have some
problems which necessitate a board resolution. This
"informal" agreement requires the directors of the bank to
sign an agreement with the local regulatory agency stating
that they understand that there are specific problems that
require specified corrective actions and will take those
actions by certain dates and inform the agency of their
progress.
A three rated bank has serious weaknesses which need to be
addressed, and because of these weaknesses is vulnerable to
the changing economic climate. A memorandum of understanding
may be placed with this bank. Both the director of the bank
and the regulators are signatories of this agreement, which
requires corrective action, but is not immediately convertible
into an enforceable action against which civil money penalties
can be fined.
A four rated bank has weaknesses which must be addressed in
order to insure its viability. This rating may require a
legal action called a formal agreement. Executed by the bank
and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve this
agreement is enforceable under the law. Under FIRREA, it is
convertible to a cease and desist order if violated. The
agreement can also for the basis of civil money penalties,
which can be as much as a million dollars a day per
infraction. Such penalties are not used all that often, but
when they are they can be significant.
A five rated bank has severe problems which seriously
jeopardize its future. This rating is usually associated with
a cease and desist order, such as the one levied against the
Bank of New England. This order states that the bank is
conducting as unsafe and unsound practice which it must cease
doing immediately and into the future. The resulting problems
must be corrected, and if the bank does not follow the
stipulations of this agreement, then the company will be
subject to fines and the directors may be held personally
liable for any losses the company suffers. "This action is
very heavy and it is something that is not entered into
lightly. ""1
There are a variety of other actions a regulatory agency may
take, including the removal of bank director and officers, as
well as the removal of FDIC insurance. Regulators try not to
use a bigger stick than is necessary when placing corrective
actions, and currently have latitude in choosing the method
and type of corrective agreements. However, there is
presently proposed legislation in front of Congressional
banking committees which would mandate the placing of certain
agreements with the different bank ratings.12
Needless to say, the regulatory agencies, and their guidelines
have a strong impact on the business practices of a bank.
Therefore, it is of paramount importance for a real estate
owner involved in a workout to understand the bank's
regulatory relationship. By understanding how his loan is
classified, a borrower can sense the negotiating latitude of
the bank, as well as help provide the information which will
minimize regulatory scrutiny of the specific loan.
1. Anonymous Interviewee, Workout Specialist, General
Partner, June 16, 1991.
2. These two preceding chapters and the whole section
concerning the regulatory bodies and their practices was
developed from an interview with Claire Desjardins, Asst.
Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Unless
otherwise specified, in the information in this chapter was
derived from the aforementioned interview.
3. "Gray Skies for California Banks", Richard W. Stevenson,
New York Times, July 8, 1991.
4. A large proportion of a bank's real estate loans are
construction and miniperm loans. Both these type of loans
usually include an interest reserve which the bank retains
for servicing of the loan, since the developer may not have
the financial capacity to do so during construction or
start-up. Therefore, when a project financed by these
methods goes into default, the assumption is that the
problems which caused default have been there for quite some
time. These problems, however, had a lagging exposure to
the bank, because of the interest reserves, which kept the
loans performing.
5. Claire M. Desjardins, Asst. Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, July 9, 1991.
6. Claire M. Desjardins, Asst. Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, July 9, 1991.
7. Claire M. Desjardins, Asst. Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, July 9, 1991.
8. The examiner is looking for "a discipline and thought
process" regarding troubled loan areas. Therefore they will
expect a bank to have used "migration" analysis to determine
the rate at which troubled properties migrate through the
risk categories from troubled to loss, and subsequently
adding to their loan loss reserves in anticipation of their
findings, and even adding additional amounts for safety
sake. Therefore, a conservative bank will have fewer
specific chargeoffs on their larger credits, since they have
already run the losses through their income statement.
9. Regulators will look at three capital ratios to get a
sense of capital adequacy. Criticized Loans (special
mention and transfer problems of international loans) vs.
capital reserve and loan loss reserve. Gross Classified
Loans (substandard, doubtful and loss) vs. capital reserve
and loan loss reserve. Weighted Classified Loans (100% of
loss, 50% of doubtful and 20% of substandard) vs. capital
reserve and loan loss reserve. If the weighted classified
ratio is 80-90% then there is little chance of continued
viability for the institution. Similarly, if the gross
classified ratio is 150-200% there are serious problems for
the bank.
10. Claire M. Desjardins, Assistant Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, July 9, 1991.
11. Claire M. Desjardins, Asst. Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, July 9, 1991.
12. Claire M. Desjardins, Asst. Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, July 9, 1991.
CHAPTER THREE
Understanding The Lender In Workout Situations
As stated in chapter two, there is a strong regulatory
influence in the way a bank will deal with workout loans,
since banks operate in a manner which is mindful of their
regulatory agency's expectations and powers. Nevertheless,
depending on a bank's policies, procedures, personnel and
structure, a bank may react in varying ways to this regulatory
pressure. Banks may not always act as regulatory agencies
would like in a workout situation.
When entering a workout scenario, a borrower must understand
the progression of a troubled loan within a bank's structure,
and how a bank views loans during this progression. Moreover,
at that critical point when the bank is weighing the viability
of pursuing workout negotiations opposed to gaining title to
the property, the developer must fully understand what issues
the bank is weighing to persuade the bank of the borrower's
preferred avenue of resolution. In this chapter, these lender
considerations will be addressed in much the way a typical
commercial bank would address them.
The Progression of a Troubled Loan:
The initial approval of a loan is sponsored by a lending
officer, who is responsible for assembling appropriate
information for analyzing the credit. When the loan is
approved it is assigned a particular risk assessment by the
lending officer and his loan approval committee.' This rating
system is often very similar to the bank's regulatory
agency's, but the bank may expand it for more precise rating,
and in fact is encouraged to do so.2  During the life of the
loan, the account officer is responsible for altering the
credit rating as circumstances change; so, as a credit
deteriorates the rating should drop.3
However, at times a lending officer may not follow these
procedures in a timely manner. Sometimes a real estate
lending department or officer may be wary of downgrading a
credit and loosing control of the loan to the workout
department, especially when the customer is considered
valuable to the department's future business. Frequently, in
the beginning of a cycle, when the loan officer is not aware
of the extent of future industry problems, he will try to find
a way to keep the loan, and nurse it back to health. However,
if a loan officer is a quality credit person, he is more
concerned with the credit rating than keeping the client, so
that he will open dialogue with the appropriate senior
officers when the credit becomes questionable.4
Aware of these inefficiencies or conflicts of interest, banks
often have an independent loan review department. The
independent nature of the loan review department allows for
objective analysis. Usually on a quarterly basis, this
department reviews loans over a certain dollar level, and less
frequently for loans which fall under this bench mark. If
necessary, they may downgrade loans and bring them to the
attention of the workout department. In this way, even loans
which are still making payments, may be downgraded and brought
to the attention of workout specialists for preventive
monitoring and change.5
To the extent that the credit becomes marginal, the workout
department will assist the loan officer with addressing the
problems in a remedial fashion. Similarly, they will be
considering protective measures for the bank.6 Typically, a
recasting of the mortgage does not occur in the lending
department, unless the customer carries some significant
element of political weight within the bank, and the bank is
not being forced to proactively take action by the regulators.
During the initial phase of default, there may be a crescendo
of discussions towards a quickly applied credit resolution,
ending when the loan reaches 90 days past due. At this point,
the bank by regulation, must show the credit as non-
performing, thereby flagging the credit for the regulators to
see. Moreover the credit most probably will be moved to the
workout department.7
"When a workout department gets a troubled loan, the
department really needs to go back to the basics, and start
from scratch, in order to gain an understanding of exactly
where the credit is... basically you need to review the
financial and legal picture." 8  The workout officer will
thoroughly review the legal documents, the lending officer's
prior oral and written correspondence--determining whether the
bank is exposed to lender liability suits, and the property's
conditions--financial and otherwise. With the many avenues a
workout can take, "the workout officer needs to understand the
cards that have been dealt".9
Legal Document Review:
The first job of the workout officer is to ascertain the
condition of the title. "If a loan has been around for
several years..., it is often assumed that the security or
UCCs (Universal Commercial Codes) were filed properly and that
they accurately describe the collateral that you think you
have, this may not be the case. The workout officer needs to
understand the loan documents and terms, as well as
subordination agreements."10  In addition, the title must be
reviewed for recent tax, judgement and mechanics liens. When
creditors have filed against the property, the officer needs
to ascertain when their preference period ends. Finally, the
workout officer must check as to whether the title insurance
is sufficient and in effect."
Another area of legal documentation import are guarantees. At
times, the actual guarantees which were supposed to accompany
the loan may have been altered or negotiated away by the
lending officer during closing, as well as other legal rights
of the bank.12  Moreover, the legal document may not have
been properly filed or executed.
Loan documents vary greatly and frequently omit essential
provisions in case of borrower default or diminish the
lender's rights, therefore the workout officer must
comprehensively review these documents. For instance, the
FNMA mortgage allows the borrower to reinstate a defaulted
mortgage till the time of judgement. It also requires the
lender to post a detailed default notice to the borrower,
thirty days prior to acceleration, thereby extending the
foreclosure process. Other standard forms inadequately
address such issues as the payment of penalties and legal
fees, as well as including a due on sale clause.13
Oral and Written Correspondence Review:
Concurrent to the documentation review, the workout officer
will work with the lending officer to review any oral or
written commitments made by either the lender or borrower,
especially those commitments made in the last ninety days or
so. "The workout officer shouldn't do anything which is
contrary to any prior commitments by the bank". 14 Through
the documentation and correspondence review, the workout
officer wishes to assess the lender liability exposure of the
bank. "Lender liability is a catch all category which has
become popular because it is easily threatened, although very
few cases have any substance. Most cases stem from
allegations of inequitable conduct of the bank which is
prejudicial to the borrower or the failure to do something
promised." 15 Despite its poor success ratio, lender
liability is one of the few negotiation axes a borrower may
wield in his defense, the threat of which may force the lender
to renegotiate its stance. At the very least, an actual suit
buys time for the borrower while costing the bank time and
money. At the most, it may result in a liability penalty
levied against the lender and awarded to the borrower.
"Typically, lender liability claims are more in the nature of
attempts to offset the debt. It is not coincidence that the
bank may sue for one half million and the lender liability
claim is about the same figure."16
"Lender liability is probably at its peak when you have a
construction loan: when the loan is out of balance and not
fully drawn. The workout officer wants to make sure that
there have been no oral or implied commitments in regards to
the extent the loan can go out of balance." 17  Other
frequent lender liability allegations follow: "failure to
issue a written loan commitment; failure to comply with or
attempt to terminate a loan commitment; undue control over the
debtor resulting in the lender's responsibility for the
debtor's debts; being the borrower's partner; failure to
disburse a loan according to its commitment; breach of
fiduciary duty; failure to act in good faith; interference
with the debtor's business; inadequately controlling debtor's
taxes; attempting to improve its position prior to bankruptcy
filing; being guilty of fraud, duress or tortious
interference; misuse of loan collateral; usury; environmental
liability; and, securities law violations." 8 As can be
seen, lender liability can take a myriad of forms -- some more
legitimate than others. The bank's exposure to such suits may
sway a workout officer to forgo the bank's foreclosure rights
for a temporary workout alternative, in exchange for the
borrower's waiver to such claims.
Financial and Environmental Review:
While conducting this initial due diligence, the workout
officer will also try to understand the financial fundamentals
of the property. This will necessitate an analysis of the
property's income statement and most recent appraisal to
derive a current projected value for the property. If the
bank's credit information is old, the officer may request a
new appraisal or updated financial information for the
property from the borrower.
Additionally, new personal financial statements of the
borrower and his portfolio of properties may be requested,
thereby gaining a testament to the borrower's financial
capacity to honor his guarantees. Moreover, the workout
officer needs to gain a global understanding of the liquidity
of the developer through this information, in order to
understand whether the borrower has the ability to withstand
the current downturn.19
An environmental review of the property will also be
considered when called for, because the workout officer
suspects some type of contamination of the property.
"In most instances, before a bank forecloses these
days, they take a tremendous amount of care to
assure themselves that there is no hazardous waste
that exists on the site... the bank will hire
specialist to scrutinize the property, to determine
the existence of hazardous waste. To the extent
that any waste exists on the site and the bank
takes possession or title of it... then it becomes
liable for the hazardous waste whether or not it
had anything to do with dumping the waste. "20
Since an environmentally contaminated property can represent
huge liability for a bank, workout officers rarely dismiss a
careful environmental review.
These are the key issues of consideration that a workout
officer will investigate when completing his initial due
diligence indoctrination of a troubled credit. Armed with
this knowledge, the initial meetings with the borrower will
commence. The bank will be confronted with a new set of
considerations, which will determine whether it chooses to
foreclose on the property or restructure the loan. These
following issues do not necessarily adhere to the timeline
progression presented here, to some extent they may be
reviewed in the workout officer's initial research.
Nevertheless, after indoctrination with the troubled credit,
the workout officer will focus on the bank's financial and
non-financial objectives, as well as defining constraints
which may affect the foreclosure or workout decision.
Financial Objectives:
Possibly the most important objective of the bank is limiting
non-performing asset exposure, from both a specific and global
viewpoint. Therefore, workout officers approach a troubled
loan workout with the goal of making the credit "asset good".
"One of the principle determining factors as to
what the bank may or may not do is whether or not
the loan on the books can be treated as a
performing loan or non-performing loan. To the
extent that the income doesn't service the loan it
becomes a very unattractive item on the bank's
balance sheet. The bank has much greater incentive
to take a precipitous action with the borrower to
collect its money, sell the building and liquidate
the loan. Even though there is a higher prospect
that there might be a short term loss, the bank may
in some instances rather have the certainty of the
cash in hand and eliminate the drain of a non-
performing asset, rather then sit and wait with the
borrower hoping that the market may turn around in
three years, for all the money that's owed."21
When the cash flow and guarantees are not sufficient for
maintaining the credit on performing status, the banker may
seek a cash paydown or cross collateralize the debt to make it
asset good.
"Normally in a restructure, if you can achieve it
at all, you are going to try to get some type of
cash paydown, if you can't the key is to try to
become asset good. If you can't achieve it through
the existing property--because obviously in this
market property values are falling--then the next
place a banker is going to look is to other
properties in the form of cross collateralization
(through second mortgages), partnership interests
or whatever else is available."22
The characterization of loans is an area in which the
regulators wield their influence, since ultimately they will
rule the future accounting treatment of a restructured loan,
thereby determining whether a loan is a productive asset or a
negative drag on income.
Regulators indirectly have an influence on the
workout, because when we are structuring the deal
with the borrower, we want to be mindful of not
only what the economic impact on the project will
be, but we also want to be mindful of how that deal
will be accounted for by the bank and how the
regulators will insist that the bank account for
the loan, after we strike a deal. We are striving
to maintain performing assets and we know in the
back of our mind what the regulators expect in
order to be able to characterize the loan as a
performing asset. When you are structuring a deal
you are at all times mindful of the elements of a
performing loan, and you do your best to get a deal
which would be characterized under those guidelines
performing, so that the examiners will feel
comfortable with it.23
Another financial objective of a bank involved in a loan
restructuring is the productive safety of any new money
devoted to the workout. Frequently, in a workout or mortgage
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recast the property will need an infusion of additional money
(this is especially true for construction loans), with the
only viable source being the workout lender. In such
scenarios the bank's primary question will be whether this
additional money adds value to the probability of the lender
being made whole, or at a least lessens the projected loss of
the bank. In addition, the bank will demand current interest
on the new money, legal assurance that it will have priority
over junior creditors, and economic certainty that the new
money will be repaid. This may require negotiations with not
only the borrower, but also subordination agreements with the
other creditors. 24
Finally, the workout officer must weigh the financial risks of
the bank's potential avenues of resolution, and choose the
alternative with the proper risk-return characteristics. When
considering the prospects of a successful workout program, a
bank must always weigh the financial risk of any proposed
restructuring. With the uncertainty of a deteriorating
market, the bank usually will follow the maxim: "a bird in the
hand is better than two in the bush". A lender must look for
a plan with a high probability of success, thereby avoiding
the primary financial risk of the bank, that the future
settlement of the workout plan is less than the present value
of the property to the bank. Therefore, as a bank enters a
workout agreement, it will wish to insulate itself from the
loss of new money, further deterioration of the value of the
project, loss of interest and security impairment.25
Non-Financial Objectives:
A primary non-financial objective for a bank is to minimize
the time it takes to find a resolution to a workout--whether
it is a financial restructuring or a foreclosure action. In
a very real sense, time is money for the bank in terms of
interest, legal, opportunity and resource costs. Therefore,
the bank will view potential workouts in the context of time.
The bank strives for some comfort that it is not
going to be in the same place that it is today, six
months from now. If that's the case--if it is not
making any progress in the workout, then there in
no reason why you shouldn't just pursue your
remedies as specified under the loan documents now.
The objective is to get an improving situation,
while at the same time giving the developer some
time to bridge the temporary period of impairment.
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The minimum amount of time is especially critical when the
bank is faced with some sort of legal entanglement, such as
borrower or partnership bankruptcy and a lender liability
suit.
Defining Constraints:
Certainly on of the prime considerations of a lender when
deciding between gaining control of the property and
restructuring the loan is whether the lender can successfully
work with the borrower in the workout. This entails a
favorable assessment of the borrower's management
capabilities, commitment to the workout and predilection
towards honoring his workout commitments. In essence, the
bank needs to know that the continuation of the borrower-
lender relationship has a beneficial impact on solving the
bank's problems with the loan.
When a bank enters a workout negotiation, it will look at the
borrower's management capacity, to see if the project's
problems are a result of the company or the market. This is
a key element in deciding whether to ride the project out or
foreclose. 27  The borrower's management abilities must add
more value to the workout plan than a third party management
firm's. otherwise it may benefit the bank to pursue
foreclosure and hire a third party management firm to operate
the property until the bank can sell it.
The bank will also want to gauge the borrower's commitment to
a successful workout resolution. One way this is manifested
is by the borrower's cooperation in providing the bank with
the necessary financial information on the property, the
borrower's other properties, the guarantors and any other
information that the lender may need to make completely
informed decisions on the viability of a workout. When the
borrower is not forthcoming with information, the workout
officer is unable to prudently make a commitment to the
project and can only make negative assumptions, which lead the
bank towards a foreclosure action.
Moreover, the bank is looking for a proactive attitude towards
restructuring negotiations. As one workout officer said:
What I would say to most borrowers is that they
shouldn't down play how important it is to -- on
the outside at least -- work with the banker. The
individuals who come in and show an unwillingness
from the beginning to negotiate, and try to work
with the bank with some give and take, end up
hurting themselves in the long run, because they
create this animosity that in some cases is
reflected in the terms that are being offered.28
In order to assure the borrower's commitment to the project,
banks usually try to maintain and even increase their
guarantees and collateral.
Most important to the banker are the guarantees on
the debt--that is you are going to want the
developer to be behind whatever restructure you are
working on one hundred percent, because they are
the person closest to the property. They are the
ones who are most likely going to work out a deal -
- to find tenants, to get the tenant fit up at the
proper price, to manage the project, etc. So you
are going to want -- in essence -- their feet to
the fire throughout the term so that they know if
they don't perform that there is a consequence --
that is that their name and their personal assets
are on the line. 29
Finally, when assessing the benefit of continuing to work with
the borrower, the bank will want to determine whether the
borrower will honor his prior and new commitments.
A workout officer wants a familiarity with the
history of the situation, meet the people,
understand the principals' characters,
personalities, temperaments and their desire to
stay with the project. To some degree if possible
measure their integrity, although this is very
difficult to do, until a situation gets into a push
or shove condition. Will they stand behind their
commitment and promises?30
This is a key ingredient to the bank's willingness to work
with a borrower, towards a joint resolution of the property's
problems.
There are two other constraints which are of defining
magnitude, but are themselves unrelated. The first is the
potential of sale if the bank takes back the property. It
does no good for the bank, if they take back the property into
OREO and can not sell it, and thus still maintain the asset on
their books as non-performing status. This is especially true
when the third party management is inferior to the prior
owners'. As one workout officer stated: " the foreclosure
decision has a lot to do with the property itself and what the
bank thinks of the prospect of sale is."
The final defining constraint is the functional workout
capacity of the loan's participating group of banks, if indeed
it has one. Participation agreements are agreements between
banks which share in the underwriting of a loan. The "agent"
bank is usually responsible for the total servicing of the
loan and customer relations, while the participating bank(s)
is a silent financial partner. The participation agreement
can provide for different levels of workout powers between the
agent and participant banks. Some may have a weighted voting
system, in which key workout decisions are voted upon. Others
may weight the powers to one side. These agreements can
become a problematic factor in the viability of a workout,
since the participating banks may have extremely different
workout agendas than the agent bank.3 1  As one workout
officer stated:
Participations are my worst nightmare. I would
much prefer to work on a multi-loan direct
relationship, where I had all the debt and I had
the borrower across the table from me, then to try
to get seven banks to agree on a course of action,
all of which recognize different levels of problems
with the loan, take different tacts in terms of
chargeoffs and non-performing levels. This is
especially true with foreign banks which often have
no workout experience. 32
For the borrower attempting to restructure a workout
property's debt, success necessitates understanding a bank's
driving forces, objectives and constraints. A real estate
owner must also understand a bank's policies and procedures,
and how they change as a troubled loan progresses through the
bank. This knowledge allows the developer to present his
company, the property and other critical information from a
legitimately positive viewpoint -- the bank's viewpoint. As
one workout specialist advocates, perception is the key to
successful workouts. Perception of what the bank and workout
officer are looking for to make a positive response, and the
resulting perception of the viability of the workout that the
bank ultimately gets through the workout officer's
relationship with a well prepared borrower.33
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CHAPTER FOUR
Potential Workout Alternatives
Because of the prevalence of workouts in the early 1990's,
many banks have markedly increased their workout or
"classified loan" departments, frequently importing grizzled
workout specialists from the Texas and Arizona markets. With
a higher degree of professionalism as well as an increased
personnel pool, banks have streamlined their workout
capabilities. Moreover, with the close scrutiny of the bank
regulators, commercial banks and thrifts have focused their
attention on non-earning assets, setting clear capital goals
for the bank, by which the their workout officers set their
agendas. 1 The result of these factors is that most banks are
well versed in their workout alternatives and rights.
For the developer this means a quicker resolution of a workout
property, especially when dealing with larger commercial
banks. In the beginning of this real estate recession, many
workouts were put on hold because banks had larger workout
problems or a lack of workout acumen. This often gave a
developer the time latitude in the workout to attempt new
marketing strategies, while the loan remained in default and
on the bank's workout docket.2
However, as banks became indoctrinated with their workout
alternatives and rights, and increased staffs to handle
workloads, this latitude has for the most part vanished. In
today's market, when a property reaches the attention of a
bank's classified loan department, a developer can expect a
timely disposition following one of four resolution avenues:
1). Foreclosure, 2). Friendly Foreclosure or Deed in Lieu of
Foreclosure, 3). Restructuring of the Loan, 4). White Knight
Acquisition of the Project. The avenue of pure foreclosure
is initiated and controlled by the lender, while friendly
foreclosure, deed in lieu of foreclosure, restructuring of the
loan and white knight acquisition require joint commitment.
A fifth alternative--chapter eleven--is controlled by the
borrower, and is often used when the borrower is trying to
stop the foreclosure action.
This chapter will discuss the four avenues of resolution which
are controlled by the lender or require lender acquiescence,
as well as the primary borrower controlled resolution --
chapter eleven. In the case of loan restructuring the loan
modification issues will be reviewed, as well as other lender
and borrower considerations, since these latter issues are
often key parts of the total agreement, without which either
side might not agree to the restructuring.
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Lender Controlled Avenues of Resolution
FORECLOSURE:
Foreclosure is an alternative available to banks and other
lien holders, when an acceptable resolution can not be found
to rectify a borrower's default. Rarely does a lender rush to
foreclose when a mortgagor candidly communicates with the
mortgagee regarding the default and offers a realistic plan to
cure the default. Foreclosure actions are costly and often
time consuming. However, at times like these, where there is
no foreseeable quick rebound of the real estate market, banks
often initiate the action quickly, and then in the time before
sale fully consider their workout alternatives. 3 Foreclosure
proceedings are governed by state law, and vary significantly
from state to state. Therefore, it behooves a mortgagor to
understand the different foreclosure actions available in the
state of their holdings, as well as their corresponding rights
and defenses under such proceedings. There are three major
types of foreclosure: non-judicial; judicial; and strict.
Non-Judicial Foreclosure:
In some jurisdictions real estate is financed by a deed of
trust, rather than a mortgage. Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, District of Columbia, Delaware, Illinois,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia and West Virginia are states where a Deed of
Trust is common. However, this list is not complete since
other states may witness this form of ownership in smaller
degrees, although most other states have ruled that a deed in
trust is in essence a mortgage, and therefore must go through
normal court foreclosure proceedings. Three parties are
involved with the deed of trust: the borrower, lender and
trustee. Upon purchase of the property, the borrower conveys
to the trustee the deed and a trust agreement, which
stipulates the security arrangement and gives the trustee
power of sale upon default.4
For the lender, a non-judicial foreclosure usually requires
far less time and subsequent expense. The foreclosure is
controlled by the trust agreement and statutory law.
Typically the trustee must first give notice of default to the
owner for a period of fifteen to thirty days, in order to
afford the borrower time to correct the default. Next public
notice through the newspaper must be made for a specified
number of times, during a specified time period. After
completing the statutory requirements of such a foreclosure,
the trustee may conduct a private sale similar to the sale
conducted in a judicial foreclosure.5
Judicial Foreclosure:
Judicial foreclosure occurs in states which use a mortgage
deed and note. The mortgagee initiates the foreclosure by
filing a lawsuit alleging default by the mortgagor. Along
with the suit the bank must satisfy applicable procedures,
which vary from state to state. The bank should also file an
affidavit, which states that none of the defendants are in the
active military, thus satisfying the Soldiers and Sailors
Civil Relief Act of 1941.6 Upon satisfying the applicable
procedures, the court will enter a judgement, setting a
foreclosure sale and final judgement date and naming an
officer of the court to conduct the sale of the property. In
the interim, the foreclosure sale will be advertised to the
public in newspapers a specified number of times.
Upon final judgement the property will be sold by public
auction, often times on the courthouse steps. In some cases,
if the sale price is significantly below a fair market price,
the borrower may request that the auction sale be cancelled
and a new auction sale attempted or a strict foreclosure
implemented. However, the borrower must produce a legitimate
reason for the court to take such an action, such as a
conspiracy to limit bidding or a collusive sale. The cost for
a new sale will be borne by the mortgagor. This foreclosure
process at its' quickest will take three months. If a
foreclosure defense is raised, it must be dispensed of by
summary judgement. 7  Depending on the legitimacy of these
defenses, the foreclosure action can be delayed for years,
causing the bank to suffer extreme legal, forgone interest and
time costs.8
Strict Foreclosure:
Foreclosure by strict follows many of the same procedures as
that of foreclosure by sale. However, the value of the
property is determined by a certified expert, rather than by
sale. If the determined value is unsatisfactory to the owner,
he may petition the court for a foreclosure by sale. The
foreclosure occurs through a series of "law dates" which run
in reverse lien priority. On each law date the specified lien
holder has the exclusive "right to redeem" by paying a
judgement extinguishing all other lien holders' right of
redemption. If the lien holder chooses not to redeem, the
creditor looses security in the property. If no junior
creditor redeems the first mortgagor gets clear title.9
General Foreclosure Issues:
Right To Receiver:
Frequently loan documents give the mortgagee the right to
appoint a receiver to manage the property and its' financial
returns when default occurs. However, since a foreclosure
court is a court of equity this is not a forgone right, since
in essence the appointment of a receiver takes away the
benefits of ownership from the mortgagor. The bank must show
reason why a receiver should be granted control. In example,
that the borrower is not properly maintaining the project or
siphoning cash flow which should be used to pay mortgage
costs. 10
Foreclosure Funds Dispersal and Deficiency Judgments:
When a foreclosure action is consummated the resulting funds
are dispersed in order of lien priority, with any remaining
proceeds awarded to the prior owner. In cases where the
foreclosure proceeds are not sufficient to make the lien
holders whole, those creditors sue for a deficiency judgement.
This allows a creditor awarded a deficiency judgement to
attach and execute their legal remedies on other properties
owned by the mortgagor. Some states provide that certain
amounts of personal property and equity in a primary residence
shall be excluded from the seizure and sale rights of a
deficiency judgement holder.11
Redemption Rights:
During the course of the foreclosure and for a period
thereafter in certain states, the borrower has the right to
pay the full amount of debt, interest and other costs due the
mortgagee to redeem ownership. The "equity of redemption"
refers to the borrower's right to cure default from the time
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of default until foreclosure proceedings are begun.
"Statutory redemption" is the right to redeem ownership for a
specified period (6-12 months) after the foreclosure sale, and
is allowed in only certain states.12
Jointly Controlled Avenues of Resolution
There are three workout avenues which require the commitment
of both the lender and borrower. Friendly foreclosure and
deed in lieu of foreclosure accomplish the transferral of
title to the lender, the choice of which is dependent on the
debt structure of the property. Restructuring of the loan
necessitates a consensual agreement of both parties, while a
white knight acquisition requires, at the minimum, the
acquiescence of the lender.
FRIENDLY FORECLOSURE:
A "friendly foreclosure" follows the statutory requirements of
foreclosure, but usually is expedited and simplified because
of the borrower's cooperation in the foreclosure proceeding.
By agreeing to forgo its' defenses and consenting to
judgement in a foreclosure, the borrower usually saves the
creditor time and money. These benefits are augmented by the
borrower offering transitional assistance by providing
property information, fully assigning property rights, and
relinquishing all lender liability claims13 . A friendly
foreclosure is used in conveyance of title instead of a deed
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in lieu of foreclosure when there are junior lien holders on
the property, which need to be eliminated through the
foreclosure process, in order for the first mortgage holder to
gain clear title. 14
DEED IN LIEU OF FORECLOSURE:
A deed in lieu of foreclosure is the voluntary conveyance of
title in cancellation of the mortgage. This process avoids
the court process of foreclosure and thereby affords the
mortgagee time and interest savings. In return for voluntary
conveyance of the title by either foreclosure or deed in lieu,
the borrower usually obtains a waiver of deficiency in the
form of a covenant not to sue, which will be exchanged by both
parties. A first mortgage holder will pursue this option when
there are no junior lien holders, which otherwise would not be
eliminated in the process. Hypothetically, a junior lien
holder could seek acquisition of title through this process,
assuming the existing senior debt. However, this requires a
mortgagor who prefers ownership of the property over the
settlement received in a foreclosure sale.15
RESTRUCTURING OF THE LOAN:
The actual restructuring of a loan involves three potential
avenues of change: interest modification, amortization rate
change, and decreases in the amount owed. These alternatives
are not exclusive of each other and in fact are usually used
in some combination. Additionally, along with these are other
items of negotiation, which frequently are more heatedly
negotiated than the loan terms. Some of the key items the
bank will seek to obtain are: minimal performance standards,
release of future liability claims, additional
collateralization, lien priority, and possibly participation
in future profits. The borrower will seek to obtain a
forbearance agreement, minimize personal liability, structure
an economically valuable interest in the property, possibly
acquire additional funding commitments, and maintain
reputation.
Interest Modification:
The modification of the face interest rate of the mortgage can
take many forms. The simplest change is a straight reduction
of interest rate. However, this method is not usually favored
by the bank, especially when junior mortgages exist on the
property.16  Frequently, an interest pay rate will be
established with the difference between the pay rate and face
rate being accrued and added to the principal. The borrower
and the lender determine a level of current interest that the
project can safely support, with any additional interest being
accrued till the retirement of the debt or some predetermined
date. In this type of agreement, the bank may negotiate for
the right to charge and accrue interest on the deferred
interest itself. The deferred interest may be added to the
principal balance resulting in a negative amortization
mortgage or retain its character as interest. In the former
case the deferred interest will automatically bear interest,
unless otherwise agreed upon.17
A popular derivation of this type of interest modification is
the "cash flow mortgage". In this type of mortgage, the
borrower pays whatever the net cash flow of the property is to
the lender with the difference between the payment and the
face rate of the mortgage being accrued. Within this net cash
flow calculation is usually some adequate management fee for
the borrower, so that borrower liquidity can be maintained.
This type of agreement allows for fluctuations of cash flow,
and thereby protects the workout agreement from further
defaults because of payment shortfalls. Similarly it provides
for the maintenance of the property, since the borrower will
not be inclined to defer necessary maintenance to make a
mortgage payment.18  For both parties, once the general
agreement has been reached, the definition of "cash flow"
becomes of paramount importance, since it must be a manageable
and fair agreement for a successful workout. At issue will be
borrower compensation, lender compensation and guaranteed
property maintenance.19
Amortization Rate Change:
In addition to interest rate modification, the workout can
include a change in amortization rate by increasing the
amortization years or relinquishing the amortization feature
of the mortgage altogether, thereby resulting in a interest
only loan.
Decrease in the Amount Owed:
Between the time that a loan goes into default and the two
parties come to a workout agreement, large amounts of unpaid
interest and late penalties often accumulate. These elements
of a borrowers' debt are frequently negotiated in the workout
forum. Moreover, even the principal debt may be negotiated
down, when market value of the project is less than the
existing debt. Banks may consent to such an agreement in
order to provide a financial inducement to a borrower, who may
bring special management capabilities necessary to the
project. However, it should be noted that this is rarely
agreed to by the lender.
Additional Loan Restructuring Issues:
Lender Considerations:
As aforementioned, when such a debt recasting occurs other
items of importance will be negotiated by both the lender and
borrower. The bank will be concerned with structuring an
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agreement which does not impinge on their rights to the
property in case of future default. Moreover, the bank will
insist on the protection of their past and current financial
commitments to the project. Frequently, along with the loan
modification agreement and the borrower's acknowledgement of
its' past loan default, the bank will establish certain
explicit future performance standards which, if not met, will
render the loan in default, thereby allowing the bank to begin
foreclosure proceedings. In addition, should a future
default occur, the bank will wish to minimize the borrower's
ability to combat the foreclosure action. Therefore, in the
forum of the workout, the bank will insist on the release of
all future lender liability claims.
A Bank will also place great priority on the preservation of
its past and future financial commitments to the project,
posturing that it does not wish to modify the loan and forgo
its foreclosure rights to its' own detriment. When projects
have junior liens, the bank will take great care to maintain
its' lien priority, which often requires the agreement of
junior liens with or without new money being supplied by the
bank. Moreover, in order to protect its' lien's security from
future devaluation, the bank may require additional
collateralization or guarantees. 2021222324 Usually this is
also necessary for the bank in order to make the loan a
performing loan.25 In some cases, the bank may also
negotiate for participation in the project's future cash flow
and appreciation, establishing a participation agreement in
the loan modification. 26
Borrower Considerations:
Within the forum of a loan modification workout, a key concern
of the borrower is the viability of the final agreement. Time
extensions allow the effects of a workout solution to take
hold. These extensions are manifested most often in the form
of a foreclosure forbearance agreement, which states that the
bank will abstain from foreclosing on the property for a
stated period of time and which frequently is conditional upon
the borrower meeting specified performance standards.
As a practical matter, the borrower must negotiate for an
agreement which provides reasonable compensation for the time
and equity committed in the workout. Even the lender
recognizes that borrower liability is often insufficient
inducement for an owner to continue with a problem property.
In such instances negotiations concentrate on establishing
equitable financial inducements, which allow for the owner to
remain a financially viable entity, with some form of future
potential profit. The borrower will also attempt to
minimize any additional personal liability and
collateralization. Similarly, the owner will negotiate for
reducing current personal liability, especially when the
market value has already decreased below the project's
debt. 27 Since the bank wishes to keep the "fire under the
owner", it will rarely agree to immediate reductions in
personal liability 28 , but may in some instances agree to
staggered personal liability reductions, conditional on
reaching other specified project performance levels.29
Another consideration of the borrower is the procurement of
new funds, when the workout requires it. With the severe
credit crunch in the real estate market, often this means
acquiring these funds from the lender in the workout.
Moreover, since any borrower who enters a workout will find it
more difficult to obtain financing in the future, a borrower
should acquire a "good borrower" letter from the lender.
Although often conditional on the acceptable future
performance of the borrower, the lender should agree to stand
behind such a statement in the future. This letter should
state that the problems which arose to necessitate the workout
were due to unforeseeable economic or market changes.
Furthermore, that the borrower possesses exemplary management
capabilities. In this way the borrower will limit the damage
done because of entering into a workout negotiation.30
WHITE KNIGHT ACQUISITION OF THE PROJECT:
The white knight can take many different forms, although the
essence of the concept remains the same -- a "new person with
new money". The white knight may purchase a portion of the
63
property or all of it from the existing developer. The new
money may be used to fund project improvements, meet unpaid
costs or pay down existing debt, or some combination of the
three. This person or entity also greatly enhances the
viability of the workout for several reasons. Besides
bringing potentially attractive management capabilities, the
white knight brings money to a cash starved environment.
Therefore, he commands negotiation power with the bank, that
the owner does not. Workout committees are far more inclined
to back a new person, rather than relying on the old owner who
has already proved his inability to salvage the situation. As
one workout expert suggested, banks will often choose a
workout scenario financially less attractive but with the
white knight involved over another with just the owner
involved. 31
The Borrower Controlled Avenue of Resolution
CHAPTER ELEVEN:
Chapter eleven is a voluntary bankruptcy filing in which the
developer seeks to salvage a property or his total corporate
financial holdings by implementing a court approved
restructuring plan. Through a recent Supreme Court ruling,
individuals can now personally file for chapter eleven. This
may have far reaching affect on the way a developer handles
workouts in the future -- time will prove its value. However,
in the real estate context today, since most properties are
held in either corporate or partnership form, chapter eleven
filings are usually implemented in order to avoid a creditor's
foreclosure action on the partnership's property.
"Upon bankruptcy petition, a stay is instantly put in place
against all other petitions, with certain exceptions such a
criminal or zoning proceedings. " 2 This allows the borrower
safety from legal actions, until the court has time to
determine that it should be otherwise.
During the initial stages of chapter eleven hearings, the
court will determine whether there were any preferential
transfers, which for the purpose of equity to the creditors
should be overturned. There are a number of guidelines within
bankruptcy law which determine whether a transfer is
preferential.33 Usually transfers which have occurred within
ninety days to unrelated parties will be reviewed, while for
related parties (for instance, family members) transfers
within one year prior to bankruptcy filing will be
reviewed. 34
Also during the initial stages of chapter eleven hearings, the
creditors will petition the court for either a relief from
stay or a bad faith filing ruling. A relief from stay allows
the particular petitioning creditor to continue its legal
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proceedings outside the bankruptcy court, which usually means
the continuation of a foreclosure action. The purpose of a
bad faith filing ruling is to have the court rule that there
is no possibility for the developer to resurrect his property,
partnership or corporation, and therefore the bankruptcy
filing should be changed to a chapter seven filing, which
mandates the liquidation of holdings for the benefit of the
creditors. These are major hurdles for the borrower, for
which he must come prepared to defend against in the
bankruptcy court. 3 5
Another area of concern for creditors is how the court views
their security. A judge may rule that a creditor is so secure
in their lien that current interest will not be paid to that
lien holder. Conversely, creditors which have no security
will most probably not be due current interest on their lien
either, since presently they have no hope of remuneration, and
can only hope that they will in the future through
restructuring. Because of these dynamics, when entering a
chapter eleven proceeding, nearly all creditors try to
convince the court of a property's value being just above or
equal to their level of debt against the property. If this is
determined to be the case, the court will likely award that
creditor current interest on its debt, so that there in no
potential for the security of that lien holder diminishing.36
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The Restructuring Plan:
In the first one hundred and twenty days after filing for
chapter eleven bankruptcy, the borrower has the sole right to
file a restructuring plan which will be ruled upon by the
court, thereafter any creditor may file an alternative
restructuring plan.37 The two key issues which the plan must
satisfy are that the plan is equitable and viable. Courts
usually view equity in the context of chapter seven. That is
that whatever a creditor would most probably receive in a
liquidation in today's market should be acceptable through a
restructuring. 38  Viability is determined by the court and
creditors, which will be more thoroughly discussed in the
ensuing chapter. However, generally a plan is considered
viable when the problems are considered temporary in nature or
rectifiable, and through the plan creditors will be better off
than through a chapter seven liquidation. Moreover, great
emphasis will be placed on the believability and feasibility
of the plan. Correctable problems include such circumstances
as: "when the business is starved for capital, construction is
unfinished, the business is broken and needs to be fixed,
nobody's buying, the business is laboring under impossible
burdens, uncoordinated and hostile actions among creditors are
actually hurting the creditors themselves, onerous,
unreasonable or hostile contracts must be terminated, or when
control must be changed to prevent assets from being
wasted. "39
Within a borrower's plan the creditors are segregated into
different classes of debt; each class should be comprised of
creditors with similar claims. The actual classification of
creditors is subject to the scrutiny of the court. If it is
determined to be irregular -- because the borrower has
classified creditors in a manner geared towards ratification
of the plan, rather than objective similarities -- the plan
may be ruled untenable, thereby resulting in a ruling against
the borrower's plan. Therefore, it is in the borrower's best
interest to make reasonable, tenable classifications.40
Obtaining ratification of a restructuring plan is complicated
and problematic. Within the plan each class will receive a
general treatment or payment schedule. The creditor classes
will be characterized by the court as secured (unimpaired) or
impaired.41
"A class of claims is considered impaired by the
plan unless it has the following status: the plan
leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and
contractual rights of claims holders in the class;
the plan cures all pre-bankruptcy arrearages,
reinstates the maturity of the claims, and
compensates the claims holders for damages incurred
as a result of reasonable reliance on their
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contractual provisions; or, the plan pays the
allowed amount of such claims in cash on the plan's
effective date. "42
This differentiation is important since only impaired classes
are allowed to ratify a plan. Unimpaired classes have
priority in distributions and are considered secured, and thus
are deemed to have accepted the plan. An impaired class
accepts a plan when at least two thirds in amount and one half
in number of its members approve the plan.43
"If all classes of impaired claims accept the plan,
and if the debtor satisfies all of the other
elements of Section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
the bankruptcy court will confirm the plan, and the
plan becomes binding on all creditors. If,
however, the plan does not receive a sufficient
vote in all impaired classes, but at least one
impaired class does accept the plan, the plan may
be crammed down, provided that the court believes
that the plan does not discriminate unfairly and is
fair and equitable to the dissenting class or
classes. ,44
Thus, a dissenting class of creditors may be forced to accept
a plan, their objections "crammed down".
One complicating factor to this process is the rights of
partially secured creditors under 1111(b) (2) of the bankruptcy
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code. Under this section of the code, a partially secured
creditor can elect to have his entire claim characterized as
fully secured, thus necessitating provision under the plan for
additional deferred cash payments for this newly characterized
amount. A partially secured creditor becomes a wild card in
the ratification of a plan. The creditor, if it believes that
by remaining impaired it can control the voting class of
undersecured creditors -- and thus voting down the plan, may
choose to refuse to make an 1111(b)(2) election, and forfeit
the additional deferred cash payments. 45 This, needless to
say can severely curtail the probability of ratification of a
borrower's plan, especially when there are many partially
secured creditors.
Nevertheless, chapter eleven offers the only alternative
available -- outside of a lender liability suit -- for a
borrower when faced with an implacable lender marching down
the foreclosure route. Lenders avoid chapter eleven
proceedings since, outside of being subject to the rulings of
the court, they inevitably incur significant time, resource
and legal costs, for which they may never receive recompense.
While the borrower will also incur significant bankruptcy
costs, he may end up with the upside of ownership of the
property; the lender has no such upside. Therefore, lenders,
despite what they might indicate otherwise, must carefully
factor in the specter of chapter eleven when negotiating with
70
a borrower. Thus, the threat of chapter eleven can be a
significant negotiating tool for the borrower, especially when
the lender recognizes its viability. The lender is forced
then to consider what a restructuring plan would be through
bankruptcy, and if prudent structure such a deal before
incurring the additional costs of bankruptcy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Global Workout Strategies
"Workout is an art and not a science. There are no
absolute rules. Certainly knowledge and experience
are necessary.. .but not the only ingredients.
That's why technicians, lawyers etc., don't make
good workout persons in general. Success lies in
the ability of the workout specialist to perceive
each property's problems, the issues surrounding
the problem, and how the lender perceives the
situation. How does the creditor that you happen
to be talking to perceive the developer? If they
perceive a bad faith creditor, you'd better change
their attitude quickly... If a lender is wrong about
where they think they stand, you must change that
perception.. .Anybody who does a workout by the book
is not going to be a good workout person." 1
Experience and intuition allow a workout specialist to
understand where a bank differs in opinion on a property with
its borrower(s), and work towards aligning those opinions with
the borrower's. Moreover, it allows for an assessment of a
bank's potential negotiating flexibility with a problem
property, thereby enabling the workout specialist to obtain
the most favorable workout alternative available.2
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This experience is necessary due to two main areas of
uncertainty. First -- each bank handles a workout
differently. It depends on their workout capabilities,
regulatory scrutiny, perception of the market's future and
internal agenda in response to these factors. For instance,
one of the largest banks in Boston recognized the extent of
the problematic market and their loan portfolio very early on,
resulting in the bank taking a very aggressive posture in
their workout negotiations. Outside observers noted that the
bank opted for taking back properties quickly, unless there
was a clear, highly probable workout solution. It can be
surmised that this bank concluded that it would be able to get
past this troubled time more quickly than other banks by
adopting this agenda.
Other banks, however, have taken a slower approach to their
real estate loan problems because of a smaller magnitude of
loans in default, or a less pessimistic perception of the
market. In addition, there are often other mitigating
factors. For instance, many banks do not have a separate
workout department to handle problem loans, thus relying on
loan officers to handle these situations. These loan officers
are often ill prepared for the additional responsibility.
This is certainly true of many thrift institutions and even
some smaller commercial banks. Even banks with workout
departments may have varying levels of expertise.
Similarly, banks have varying appetites for taking back
properties to be held in OREO, and therefore some banks may be
willing to negotiate agreements that other banks would never
consider. There is no way for banks in general to follow one
correct internal agenda for dealing with real estate loan
problems. For the real estate owner, however, it is important
to understand that banks treat workout negotiations in very
different ways. A borrower must perceive the internal agenda
of a bank in a workout environment and the workout abilities
of the officer assigned to his particular loan, subsequently
acting in a prudent manner according to these perceptions.3
Just as there are varying internal agendas within banks
regarding workout negotiations, so too are there varying
personalities and capabilities among workout officers. Some
may adopt a hardline posture to negotiations, with the
attitude that unless the borrower acts in response to their
wishes the borrower will suffer the legal consequences, while
others may be more considerate of the situational conditions
which brought on the problem. However, despite varying
negotiation tactics, the main consideration of the borrower
should be to recognize that workout officers, like everyone
else, are subject to their personalities and capabilities.
If a workout officer feels that you are not working with him,
are dealing in bad faith or just doesn't like the borrower's
attitude, his negotiations will be conducted largely in
response to these attitudes. This becomes especially
problematic when the lending officer, who may have in fact
originated the loan, conducts the workout negotiations. In
this case, it may be hard for him not to feel let down or
betrayed by the borrower, and therefore not conduct
negotiations in a objective manner. Nevertheless, borrowers
need to develop the intuitive capabilities to understand the
varying ways a bank and its' workout officer deal with a
workout, in order to successfully survive in a workout
environment.4 As a first step in this process, a borrower
must understand the regulatory scrutiny which banks
experience, as well as their objectives and considerations in
a workout environment.
Workout Negotiation Preparation:
Nearly every real estate owner and developer who begins to
have problems with their properties goes through a trying
period of conflicting emotions. This is especially true of
borrowers who have not experienced a recessionary market
before. They suffer through periods of denial, anger and
depression before becoming resolved to their situation and
beginning to make positive progress towards the resolution of
their problems. The borrower needs to recognize that this is
a natural reaction, and by so doing hasten its progress, and
concentrate on the work at hand.5
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When a borrower is confronted with the reality that many of
his properties are suffering problems which necessitate a
workout discussion with the bank(s) , he must first go through
a process of preparing property specific and personal
financial information which will be needed in the workout
negotiations. At the same time he should engage legal counsel
to become familiar with his rights under the loan documents
and applicable business statutes. Finally, the borrower
should review his company's operations, being mindful that the
lender will be assessing his management capabilities during
the negotiations.
When preparing property and personal financials, the borrower
should take a conservative approach. It does not pay either
the lender or borrower to negotiate deals based upon overly
aggressive financial information which could eventually lead
to a second default by the developer. If this happens, the
borrower exposes himself to a potential liability suit for
misrepresentation, and at the very least tarnishes his
reputation as a competent manager.
The borrower should produce property specific information
which includes a property description, a status indication (in
example workout, foreclosure, default or current) so that the
bank can assess the borrower's overall portfolio condition, a
conservative property income statement, and finally a list of
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the property's liabilities ( secured debt, mechanics liens,
trade debt, etc.). Most importantly, the developer should not
indicate his estimate of value, this can be done in
negotiations if necessary.6
Personal financials should not be produced in the standard
format either. As one workout specialist said:
I do not encourage a developer to give a standard
financial statement. If it is ever perceived later
as a request for forbearance, forgiveness or
whatever, and the deal doesn't work out as
perceived, I don't want the bank to have recourse
against the developer, arguing that the only reason
we did this deal was because of you representations
on your financial statements. Value is the problem
here. It absolutely serves the developer no
purpose to give the bank a financial statement that
says this is what my properties are worth. The
bank has enough technical experts in the bank or
available to estimate the valuation of the
project... There are other ways to do it. List the
project describing it as best you can, liabilities,
status, etc., and then state the developer's
estimate of what is his net equity in each
property.. .He's not saying how he arrived at this
number; he could be talking about the future value,
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which is conditional on his ability to cut certain
deals. This doesn't mean you list zero since you
can't negotiate in bad faith.7
"Banks always ask for personal and property financial
statements, because absent information neither they or anybody
else can make a decision that they feel will not be criticized
later." Therefore, it benefits the developer to have this
information prepared as indicated, since it expedites the
progress of negotiations.
In addition to the preparation of descriptive financial
information, the borrower should also review his company for
operational inefficiencies. More than ever, the borrower must
be the head of a streamlined, highly efficient management
firm. "Regardless of anything the borrower can bring to the
table in a loan restructuring, the lender cannot justify a
workout strategy that includes the borrower if the borrower
cannot effectively manage the property... A borrower should
approach the lender armed with information and material that
will convince the lender of its managerial capabilities. "9
The production of this financial and management information
prepares the borrower for the inevitable request from the
lender for it. Timely, cooperative response to these
requests, not only provides the lender extra time to work
towards a successful restructuring, but it also creates a
favorable impression of the competency and efficiency of the
borrower, which is necessary for the lender's comfort in
pursuing a continued relationship. This impression can be
especially augmented when it is the borrower who broaches the
need for workout negotiations -- even before loan default, and
comes to the first meetings prepared to discuss a specific
workout plan he has originated. Such a proactive approach can
help the borrower control the workout agenda, and should be
adopted where possible.10
Portfolio Review and Analysis:
Having reviewed each of his properties, a developer must next
make some hard decisions as to which properties to keep and
which properties to eliminate from the portfolio through a
deed in lieu or foreclosure transferral. While there are no
rules for such analysis, there are clearly some considerations
to keep in mind.
First, the developer must make realistic assumptions about the
value of his properties. Too often a real estate owner feels
that a property must be worth at least the mortgage amount.
This may not be the case, especially with properties which
will produce no income in the near future, such as raw land or
projects stuck in approval. "We are in times where valuation
is a very difficult thing.. .what a developer really has to do
is produce a NOI that's real.. .and then translate that with a
ten or eleven capitalization rate (a conservative cap rate) to
come up with a value, especially in the absence of any
comparables.",,1
Having performed these valuations, the developer must then
look at the property from a liability standpoint, comparing
the value and level of debt to ascertain potential equity. It
is important to note that just because there appears to be no
equity in a particular project, or even a deficiency, this
doesn't necessarily mean that a developer should decide to
eliminate the parcel through a deed in lieu or foreclosure
transferral. In some instances, through a loan restructuring
or a discounted payoff, a borrower may be able to create
equity. Moreover, in marginal equity cases there still may be
financial inducement to retain ownership due to a flow of
management fees.
The foregoing analysis gives the owner an initial survey of
properties that may be worth saving in a workout environment.
However, while doing this analysis, the developer must always
consider three key issues. First, what are the workout
postures of banks that the borrower will be dealing with? A
borrower must weigh the viability of particular workout
scenarios in light of the banks he is working with. Chapters
two and three give some insight into this assessment, but
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proper negotiation strategy cannot be taught through
traditional methods.
Second, the borrower must always remember that cash flow is
king. Unless the resulting workout portfolio provides cash
flow to the borrower he may not be able to ultimately weather
the storm. There has to be some incentive to withstand the
aggravations of a workout. If this can't be achieved the best
alternative may be chapter eleven (see chapter eleven
discussion in chapter four).
Thirdly, how does the outcome in each workout scenario affect
the borrower from a tax standpoint. Borrowers often overlook
the tax ramifications of their workout agreements, when
conducting workout negotiations. These tax ramifications
should always be an integral part of a developer's strategy
when going through a workout. In such situations, borrowers
should always retain a competent tax consultant. Some tax
issues worthy of consideration are highlighted below.
Tax Considerations:
When modifying a loan in workout, a borrower must be cognizant
of the possibility of generating debt forgiveness income.
Governed by the original discount rules, the key issue is
whether by modifying the loan the old debt is deemed exchanged
for a new debt instrument. This is determined by scheduling
out the principal and interest payments and discounting them
back at the applicable federal discount rate to obtain a
present value of the old and new debt. The difference between
the two may be deemed debt forgiveness income. The borrower
needs to plan around this potential tax liability when
negotiating a loan modification.12
In the instance where a "white knight" becomes the solution,
the adjusted partnership may reduce the debt sharing of the
old partners, thereby resulting in a deemed distribution, with
potentially adverse tax consequences. These tax consequences
occur when the constructive distribution exceeds the existing
partner's tax basis, or if a deemed sale is triggered. If the
debt is recourse and the new partner does not bear any
economic risk (i.e. enters as a limited partner), then no cost
basis change will occur for the old partners. However, if the
"white knight" guarantees prior non-recourse debt, or takes on
a portion of the existing economic risk, the old partners may
be subject to adverse tax consequences.13
Any Foreclosure, or "deed in lieu", transaction subject solely
to non-recourse debt is deemed a sale or exchange for the
amount of the debt. With the amount realized on the exchange
being the full amount of debt, taxable gain results from the
difference between the amount of debt and the basis in the
property. 14
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With recourse debt, when the fair market value of the property
conveyed is greater or equal to the debt, then the amount
realized through conveyance is equal to the amount of debt.15
However, if the fair market value is less than the recourse
debt, then the transaction must be bifurcated into taxable
income and debt forgiveness income. In a bifurcated
transaction the difference between the fair market value and
the cost basis is deemed taxable income. Any debt discharged
which exceeds the fair market value is deemed debt forgiveness
income. In example, suppose the following foreclosure
scenario: Cost Basis=$100,000, Recourse Debt=$200,000, and
Fair Market Value=120,000. In this case, the taxable gain
would be $20,000 and the debt forgiveness income would be
$80,000. Section sixty one of the tax code describes debt
forgiveness as a type of income since it is interpreted as a
form of enrichment; money which would have offset the forgiven
liability can now be used for another purpose.16
Section one hundred and eight of the tax code provides an
important exception to the taxation of debt forgiveness
income. This section of the code provides that forgiveness
income is not taxable in three cases: "1) . a bankruptcy
discharge under Title 11; 2). a discharge while the taxpayer
is insolvent; 3). a discharge from qualified farm
indebtedness". The most important qualifier for real estate
owners is "a discharge while the taxpayer is insolvent", with
insolvency defined as the excess of liabilities over the fair
market value of assets. This exclusion is applicable until
the point that the taxpayer becomes solvent. However, for
this benefit the taxpayer must pay a toll charge defined under
section one hundred and eight. For the exclusion of otherwise
taxable income, a reduction of certain tax attributes must be
made: 1). net operating losses;2). general business credit
carryover; 3). capital loss carryover; basis reduction;
foreign tax credit carryovers. The reduction is dollar for
dollar, except for general business credit and foreign tax
credit carryovers which are one third that amount.17  Since
the debtor can choose the means of reduction, reducing the
basis of a property which may be held until better financial
times or death offers a significant tax planning
alternative. 18
Portfolio Workout Issues:
Before addressing the actual preservation or elimination
negotiations necessary in a portfolio workout, certain issues
must be addressed. The first two affect the relative
negotiating strength of the borrower when going through the
portfolio workout process. The third regards the borrower's
need to maintain a honorable reputation. Finally, a strategy
for dealing with unsecured debt will be considered.
The form of property ownership, whether all the properties are
held by one entity or each property is held by a separate
partnership, will dictate the size of the hammer held by the
lender. Specifically, when the lender goes through workout
negotiations, if all the properties are held by one entity,
the lender will feel that it has deficiency recourse through
the other properties, and therefore will not necessarily agree
to deficiency forbearance agreements. Since the borrower
cannot throw just one partnership in Chapter 11 (which is not
the case when properties are held in separate partnerships),
and is working against a global bankruptcy, the bank knows
that it may have a significant negotiation threat. The bank
will be looking for a deficiency payoff by the borrower or
even other banks involved in the portfolio workout. This is
one of the reasons that borrowers often try to have a global
workout, with all the creditors involved at once. The
argument for such a global workout is that it eliminates the
sway one creditor may have on the workout, since each bank's
claims will be offset by the other banks', forcing them to
work together for a common solution to the borrower's troubled
portfolio. The argument against this method, however, is that
each bank has a separate agenda which may make it impossible
for all to agree on one solution. If just one bank refuses to
go along with an agreement, then the borrower may be forced
into an involuntary bankruptcy. Therefore, whenever possible,
a borrower should try to keep negotiations separate. While
this is not impossible, it certainly is not an easy
accomplishment. 19
Ironically, when a owner only has a few workout situations and
a goodly amount of equity in the remaining properties, the
workout bank may have greater negotiation powers, because it
will always have deficiency recourse in the equity of other
properties in the portfolio. When the borrower does not have
much equity in other properties, the lender will be
negotiating in fear of the borrower's ultimate bankruptcy,
especially when the bank is negotiating for the transferal of
title. The bank will want to structure a deal which is
consummated at least ninety days before bankruptcy, so that
the transfer is not considered a preferential transfer. In
the case of a loan restructuring, the bank will know there is
no deficiency recourse but that it is already secured by the
property to the extent it ever will be, and in fact will be
trying to keep the developer out of personal bankruptcy.20
There is one way, however, that a borrower can be assured that
he will suffer either a partnership or personal bankruptcy.
If a borrower is perceived (even if he is not) to be dealing
in bad faith, commingling funds, fraudulently transferring
money, doing property transfers for less than value or even
burying money in the ground, he can be assured that a bank
will move quickly to protect their interests. In other words,
in absence of other recourse, they will throw the partnership
or the developer into involuntary bankruptcy. The point is
that a borrower must take every precaution possible to assure
the bank of his legitimate, legal commitment to the
rectification of his problems. Too many developers have been
thrown into bankruptcy, and face the specter of jail because
of the illicit movement of funds for this not to be completely
true. 21
The final issue to be addressed is the handling of unsecured
loans. Frequently, real estate owners have large amounts of
unsecured credit, which were used for personal reasons,
operational shortfalls or property maintenance. When the
unsecured creditors recognize that the borrower is having
troubles by a default or otherwise, they will immediately
accelerate the loan and seek payment. Since what little cash
reserves the borrower might possess are needed for other
critical issues, repayment of credit lines most likely will
not occur. Therefore, the only recourse for the unsecured
creditors is to seek a deficiency judgement, which allows the
unsecured creditor to attach a lien on one of the properties
owned by the developer. In many cases, if a borrower allowed
every unsecured creditor to attach to the few properties which
still had some equity there would be no reason for the
borrower to avoid bankruptcy. Besides being the financial
upside for the borrower, the remaining equity in the portfolio
must be preserved often times so that secured creditors can
obtain additional collateral, which is necessary for a loan
restructuring -- so that the bank can show their loans as
performing loans. For these reasons, it is critical that a
developer avoid allowing the unsecured creditors to attach
their judgement liens to his properties. Needless to say,
this can be a trying exercise.22
The borrower should attempt to persuade the unsecured
creditors who are pursuing judgement liens that there is
limited equity in the portfolio and that in order to complete
a successful portfolio workout, the developer will have to
preserve that equity. Since it is not equitable to secure
only a few unsecured creditors, the borrower should not secure
any of them. If any unsecured creditor attaches to a
property, the borrower will have to let the other unsecured
creditors know, and in fact may throw the property or himself
into voluntary bankruptcy, where the particular creditor may
be deemed a preferential transfer or gain less than nothing --
because of its' resulting legal costs.23
In most cases, the amount a property will sell for in a
involuntary liquidation will never provide recompense for
unsecured creditors. Therefore, most reasonable unsecured
creditors will be willing to work with a borrower through his
problems, hoping that after the borrower becomes financially
sound again the unsecured creditor will be paid off, or at
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least partially so. In the interim, the borrower may be able
to negotiate with the unsecured creditor a deal which includes
a long forbearance agreement and establishes the amount owed
(which often times may be less than the amount loaned), with
early payoff reductions to that amount. An alternative to
such separate agreements is a pooling agreement, in which all
the unsecured creditors agree to one deal. This agreement
will allot percentages to each creditor. When the borrower
begins to sell his properties for a profit, a portion of the
funds will be given to the pool, and distributed according to
the creditor's allotted percentage.24
In either case, if it comes to pass that the developer has
excess dollars after paying off the secured debt, the
unsecured creditors will most likely agree to a partial
payment in exchange for the extinguishing of the debt. They
are forced to realize that the developer can not work forever
to repay past debts25; "most people recognize that slavery is
unconstitutional."26 If that were not the case, the borrower
would still declare bankruptcy, and so creditors will agree to
a discounted payoff.
Workout Negotiations:
To a great extent the majority of the issues which are
involved in workout negotiations have already been discussed
in this thesis. Chapter two explains the influence that the
regulatory agencies have on banks in a real estate workout
environment, through their review, rating and corrective
actions. Chapter three reviewed the progression of a troubled
loan through a typical bank, until the point it is turned over
to a workout department. It then considered the financial and
non-financial objectives, as well as the defining constraints
of a bank in a workout negotiation. The purpose of those
chapters was to provide a knowledge base to assist a borrower
entering a workout negotiation.
Chapter four explained the avenues that can be followed in a
workout situation, as well as the negotiation goals of the
lender and borrower in a loan restructuring. Chapter five has
thus far reviewed the specific portfolio and tax issues which
a borrower must consider before entering workout negotiations.
The final topic this thesis will consider is the negotiation
tacts that a developer can take when negotiating the
restructuring of a loan or the transferral of title.
Loan Restructuring:
In the initial stages of the loan restructuring negotiations
the lender will be assessing the quality of real estate
management and expertise the borrower brings to the situation.
As we have discussed, the borrower exhibits this expertise
through the timely production of information on the property
and its' guarantors. Moreover, he should be prepared to
address the default with a cogent, realistic loan
restructuring plan. As we have considered, these workout
negotiations are subject to the vagaries of the bank and its'
workout officer, and therefore the borrower's workout
representative must perceive the unspoken issues involved in
the negotiations, in order to respond accordingly. During
all of these negotiations, the borrower must attempt to bring
the workout officer's understanding of the issues in concert
with the borrower's, thereby creating a workout deal the
borrower can live with (see chapter four for the negotiations
objectives of the borrower in a loan restructuring) .27
To the extent the workout representative cannot bring about
this meeting of the minds, he must consider his options. This
may mean considering the viability of a lender liability suit,
if indeed there is a basis for one. It will certainly mean
considering a chapter 11 filing, if there is no other
alternative. Depending on the strength of either alternative,
the bank will be forced to factor in the time, legal and
resource costs of getting involved in a lender liability suit
or chapter 11, while conducting the restructuring
negotiations. By doing so, the bank is forced to consider the
alternative of not coming to an agreement on a loan
restructuring, the result being that it may agree to
negotiation points to which it might otherwise have not.28
While there may be no easy way to discuss a lender liability
suit with the lender, chapter 11 discussions do not have to be
of a combative nature. Indeed it serves no purpose for the
borrower to be combative, the borrower must always strive for
a cooperative negotiation towards a common goal -- the
resolution of a problem loan. When discussing chapter 11 it
should never be a threat, but rather the natural alternative
for the borrower, since he is so committed to the preservation
of the property. In many ways, it only witnesses the
borrower's commitment. These are the last trump cards for the
borrower, before he is actually forced into a foreclosure or
voluntarily filing for restructuring in bankruptcy.29
One negotiation tactic which can be very effective is to
approach the lender with the following proposal: " since the
partnership will be going into chapter eleven if we don't come
to an acceptable agreement, we will both suffer additional
costs, with the ultimate outcome being a court approved deal.
Therefore, why don't we project where we would be after a
waiver of stay is defeated, and go forward and see what the
plan might say. Let's do a non-eleven eleven". 30  If the
bank recognizes the viability and possibility of the
borrower's success in bankruptcy court, it may choose to forgo
the additional time, legal and resource costs of chapter
eleven, and more aggressively work towards a consensual
deal. 31
Another consideration is how secondary debt may in fact help
the workout negotiations. Frequently, when a secondary
creditor recognizes the intentions of the first mortgage
holder to foreclose (thereby wiping out the remaining lien
holders), it may choose to salvage the situation. If the
second mortgage holder perceives that there is potential
equity to collateralize its claims either now or in the
future, it may choose to protect its claims through a number
of mechanisms. It might consider a partial paydown of the
first mortgage, in order to make it a performing loan,
subsequently increasing its secondary lien. Another
possibility is that the second mortgage will wrap the first,
and in some way guarantee the continued servicing of the first
mortgage. In either case, the second mortgage holder will
want assurance that the first mortgage will not afterwards
reinstate its foreclosure action. This most commonly will
involve some sort of forbearance agreement.32
During the workout negotiation, the borrower may have a
tendency to be focussing on just ending the default problems.
However, the borrower must establish certain goals before
entering a workout negotiation which go beyond resolution of
default.
First, a borrower must strike a deal which will hold up to the
test of time. A new deal should be able to weather continued
real estate market declines and other property setbacks.
Banks are focussing on getting as much debt service as
possible through the restructuring, but the borrower must
focus their attention on the practicality of continued
existence of the deal. It serves neither the lender or the
borrower to structure a deal which will go into default again
within a few months. 33
Second, a borrower must structure a deal which provides
adequate management fees to not only pay employees, but also
the developer. The borrower must recognize and provide for
the necessity for adequate personal income during the period
of workout, until such time as his business will become
profitable again. 34
Third, the developer must insist that the lender agree to
significant forbearance agreements, providing a reasonable
time frame of safety for the borrower to resolve his specific
property and portfolio problems. A workout agreement is of no
value to the borrower, if the lender will be able to pursue
foreclosure four months later. The developer should be
confident that he will not have to divert resources to the
resolution of an agreement shortly after coming to a first
workout agreement. The developer must realize that his
problems may not come to an end for quite some time, and
therefore must provide for this eventuality.35
Finally, the borrower must always negotiate for minimal
collateralization on other properties. This is one of the few
things of value that a borrower may offer when negotiating
workout deals for his portfolio. Since it is a limited
quantity, the borrower must spread it as thinly as
possible. 36
Transferring Title:
When negotiating for the elimination of a parcel, the borrower
will be forced more than ever to convince the lender of his
poor financial condition. Once the borrower identifies the
properties he wishes to eliminate,
"the first step is to go to the lenders and
convince them of the facts so to speak... You may
spend a lot of time convincing them of what your
analysis is: that there is no market out there
right now for this property; that there are
comparables; that no one knows what the upside is
going to be and when, etc. ".
Nevertheless, the borrower should approach the property
negotiations as if he intends to structure a workout deal,
going so far as to suggest his intentions of following the
chapter eleven route if a deal can not be made. The lender
may be inclined to strike a workout solution which makes the
property a more valuable asset to the borrower. Otherwise,
the bank may indicate its intention to gain title, and that it
would prefer an amicable transferral. This will put the
borrower in a position to demand a minimal deficiency
agreement, in lieu of fighting it out in chapter eleven.38
Thus, an approach that could be taken is to show the lender
that the developer in this market may have a negative net
worth, and in fact may be on the precipice of a global
bankruptcy. So before this happens, why doesn't the bank take
the property back and waive the deficiency quickly, so that
they can avoid a preference ruling if the borrower does in
fact go into bankruptcy.
"Generally speaking most banks, as long as they are
sure the borrower has done nothing which is illegal
and detrimental their position..., will look hard
and fast at just taking the property back, hoping a
preference period goes by, and disposing of it and
walking away. "39
In any case, besides the transferral of title, the developer
will be concentrating on minimizing the agreed upon deficiency
and maximizing the forbearance period. Again the borrower
must protect itself from later actions, which may debilitate
the borrower or force the borrower to file for chapter eleven.
In addition, the borrower should try to contractually agree to
discounted deficiency payoffs, to which, considering the
potential for borrower bankruptcy, the lender should happily
consent. 40
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CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion
Throughout this thesis the author has tried to provide a base
level of information on the issues surrounding workout
negotiations, with an eye towards negotiations which
ultimately lead to the survival of the borrower through a real
estate recession. A borrower must understand the regulatory
forces (chapter two) which affect the way a bank approaches a
workout. Moreover, the borrower must understand the workout
mechanisms, objectives and constraints of the bank entering a
workout situation (chapter three). In this way, the borrower
may develop the intuition necessary to successfully negotiate
with the lender. Part and parcel to these successful
negotiations, the borrower must understand the complexities of
potential avenues of resolution for workouts. (chapter four).
Finally, the developer must develop a proactive portfolio
workout strategy, which enables the to borrower to negotiate
effective agreements leading to the ultimate survival of the
real estate owner and his company. This is a complex, multi-
disciplined area, which first and foremost necessitates a real
estate owner to surround himself with competent professionals.
However, the borrower must groom and guide these talents
towards a successful end.
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